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Evil and the Evidence for God: The Challenge of John Hick's Theodicy, by R. 
Douglas Geivett. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1993. Pp. 
xii and 276. $44.95 (Cloth), $24.95 (Paper). 
MICHAEL BERGMANN, University of Notre Dame 
It may come as somewhat of a surprise to learn that nearly half of a book 
on John Hick's response to the problem of evil is devoted to defending 
natural theology. But according to Geivett, the main weakness of Hick's 
theodicy is its failure to acknowledge and depend on the successes of 
natural theology. Thus, Geivett treats the twin tasks of critiquing Hick's 
soul-making theodicy and responding to Hick's downplaying of theistic 
argument as parts of a single project: arguing in favour of a return to 
the Augustinian tradition in theodicy. 
There are three parts to Geivetf s book (as well as an afterword by 
Hick). In the first part, Geivett introduces the problem of evil and pre-
sents both the traditional Augustinian response as well as Hick's soul-
making theodicy. The remainder of the book follows the outline estab-
lished by the four main headings under which Geivett analyzes Hick's 
theodicy in part I: epistemology, the subject of part II, and teleology, 
anthropology and eschatology which are considered in part III. 
In part II of the book, Geivett contends that natural theology plays a 
crucial role in responding to the problem of evil. He notes that the cur-
rent trend of classifying responses to the problem of evil as either 
defences (which show that the existence of God is compatible with the 
existence of evil) or theodicies (which attempt to provide plausible rea-
sons God might have for allowing evil) neglects a third alternative 
which he endorses: that of showing that it is rational to believe that the 
traditional Christian God exists and, therefore, that God must have a 
good reason for allowing evil even if we have no idea what that reason 
might be. Geivett maintains that if theistic belief is to be rational, it must 
be based on theistic arguments and not merely on religious experience. 
He takes several chapters to present and defend an argument for the 
existence of God which (he claims) establishes that a rational person 
should believe that the universe had an absolute beginning, that this 
beginning had a nonnatural cause and that this nonnatural cause is per-
sonal, very powerful and good. 
Part III deals with Hick's theodicy proper. Geivett's main objection to 
the teleology in Hick's theodicy has to do with Hick's claim that fulfill-
ment of God's purpose of soul-making requires that humans be created 
morally imperfect. In connection with the anthropological aspects of his 
theodicy, Geivett's focus is Hick's view of human freedom which 
Geivett thinks is incoherent (p. 203). And with respect to the eschatolog-
ical dimension of Hick's theodicy, Geivett's primary contention is that 
God's guaranteeing that all humans will eventually freely respond to him 
in love would preclude human freedom. 
There is much that is interesting and provocative in Geivett's book: 
his identification of a response to the problem of evil that is neither a 
defence nor a theodicy, his use of natural theology in responding to the 
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problem of evil and certain of his objections to points in Hick's theodicy. 
But there is also much about the book that seems problematic. I will 
begin my discussion of the book's difficulties by considering Geivett's 
claim to be advocating a return to an Augustinian theodicy. My remain-
ing comments fall under Geivett's headings of epistemology, anthropol-
ogy and eschatology. 
1. Is Geivett defending an Augustinian theodicy (using 'theodicy' 
broadly here to refer to all theistic responses to the problem of evil)? 
This is the stated purpose of his book. Nevertheless, there are two rea-
sons to doubt that this is what he does. First, he believes that strong 
dependence on the success of theistic arguments is essential to the 
Augustinian tradition in theodicy. But it is questionable, as Geivett him-
self recognizes (p. 240, fn. 5), whether Augustine himself considered nat-
ural theology crucial to the enterprise of formulating a theodicy. Geivett 
is correct in pointing out (pp. 11-12) that, in responding to the problem 
of evil, Augustine emphasized the importance of first believing that God 
exists. But it is doubtful that Augustine thought this belief must be 
established by theistic argument if it is to be rational.' It seems, there-
fore, that insofar as Geivett is advocating the need to employ natural 
theology, he is defending only a particular (and currently unpopular) 
version of the Augustinian tradition in theodicy, not Augustinian theod-
icy simpliciter. 
Furthermore, Geivett's theodicy differs from Augustinian theodicies 
in that it does not rely on a free will defence in the way Augustinian 
theodicies characteristically do. Geivett thinks that Alvin Plantinga's 
response to the logical problem of evil as posed by J.L. Mackie fails 
(more on this below). Geivett's response to Mackie is to acknowledge 
that God could have weakly actualized2 a world in which humans were 
free and never did wrong; nevertheless, God chose instead to weakly 
actualize a world in which humans did wrong so that they could have 
"dignity" (pp. 197-200). This dignity is a result of our realizing the value 
of freedom through experiencing wrongdoing and thereby understand-
ing more fully the momentousness of our choices. Thus, in Geivett's 
theodicy, God chose to weakly actualize a world including human 
wrongdoing rather than a world without it not because that would make 
it possible to create beings with free will but because that would make it 
possible to create beings with dignity. 
2. Epistemology. Here I want to comment both on Geivett's argument 
for the existence of God and on his claim that experience-based belief in 
God cannot be used in responding to the problem of evil in the way nat-
ural theology can. Geivett draws attention (pp. 105-109) to the implausi-
bility of Mackie's claim that no explanation is required for the beginning 
of the universe (Mackie says the universe might just have popped into 
existence out of nothing). But nowhere does he attack Hick's point that it 
is rational to think that no explanation is required for the existence of an 
eternal universe.3 This serves to highlight the fact that Geivett's theistic 
argument crucially depends on whether or not the universe had an 
absolute beginning. He says the weight of scientific opinion strongly 
supports the view that it did but he concedes that there are those who opt 
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for a beginningless universe undergoing an infinite series of expansions 
and contractions; Hick, in the afterword, says that this latter theory is 
currently considered more likely. Regardless of whether it is Geivett or 
Hick who is right about contemporary scientific opinion, this sort of evi-
dence seems like a slender reed on which to hang the rationality of belief 
in God. Who knows what scientific opinion on such matters will be in 
twenty years? This may be why Geivett also provides a philosophical 
argument that the universe had a beginning. The gist of the argument is 
that the universe could not have existed for an infinite amount of time. 
For if it did, an infinite sequence of moments would have come to an end 
in the present moment which is impossible because an infinite sequence 
can have no end. This last assumption seems to me to be quite controver-
sial. We might concede that an infinite sequence with a beginning can 
have no end. But must we conclude the same with respect to a beginning-
less infinite sequence? I think not. All infinite sequence of moments with 
no end can have a beginning; likewise, it seems that an infinite sequence 
of moments with no beginning can have an end. Objections to there 
being an actual infinite may have some force. But not enough to establish 
that a rational person should deny the possibility of an actual infinite and, 
therefore, believe that the universe had a beginning. 
This is just one weak point in Geivett's overall theistic argument. 
There are others. For example, in his argument for the goodness of the 
cause of the universe he explicitly assumes that whatever is caused by a 
personal agent powerful enough to cause the beginning of the universe 
is intended by that agent (p. 126). But must we just assume that the uni-
verse, if created, was not created by one of Hume's infant deities who 
are prone to do things which have consequences they do not intend?' If 
so, Geivett does not say why. And if Geivett's argument fails at even 
one of its stages, his overall argument fails to establish that a rational 
person should believe that a good, powerful, personal God exists. This 
is not to suggest that natural theology is of no value. But, so far as I can 
tell, the weakness of Geivett's theistic argument simply confirms the 
widely held view that we cannot expect natural theology to establish 
that theism is rational and atheism is not. 
According to Geivett, if it is rational to believe that God exists, it is 
rational to believe that he has some plausible reason for allowing evil, 
even if we do not know what that reason is. One would think that Hick 
could agree with Geivett here even though he accounts for the rationality 
of belief in God by means of religious experience, not theistic arguments. 
But Geivett doesn't want to leave this avenue open for Hick. He argues 
that the natural theologian can properly ignore the problem of evil in for-
mulating a cosmological argument since the beginning of the universe 
requires an explanation whether or not evil exists. Once the natural the-
ologian successfully argues that God exists, this conclusion can be taken 
for granted in dealing with other issues such as the problem of evil (pp. 
81-86). But Hick, according to Geivett, cannot ignore the problem of evil 
in his explanation of the rationality of religious belief because religious 
experience is on an equal footing with experience of evil and the latter 
"cancels out the prima facie evidence for religious belief" (p. 80). 
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I find this analysis of the situation quite implausible. It is better to 
think (as Geivett sometimes does) in terms of beliefs and defeaters for 
beliefs (where what gets defeated is the rationality of a belief). Suppose 
someone rationally believes in the existence of God before encountering 
the problem of evil in a powerful way. Could the rationality of such a 
belief be defeated by experiencing evil? It seems that it could. But 
whether or not it is depends on how strongly the person rationally 
believes that God exists and how strongly the experience of evil rational-
ly suggests to that person that God does not exist. It does not depend on 
whether or not one's belief in God is based on theistic arguments. For it 
may be that a person rationally believes in God with only a small degree 
of confidence on the basis of natural theology. This sort of belief will be 
easily defeated if the experience of evil strongly suggests to the person 
that God does not exist. Likewise, it may be that a person rationally 
believes in God with an extremely high degree of confidence on the 
basis of experience (perhaps Moses did). The rationality of this sort of 
belief will not be so easily defeated by experience of evil. If this way of 
looking at the matter is correct, Geivett is mistaken when he in effect 
denies that experience of evil can defeat the rationality of belief in God 
based on theistic arguments. And he needs to say much more in defence 
of his claim that experience of evil will always defeat the rationality of 
belief in God based on religious experience. 
3. Anthropology. The weakest part of the book is Geivett's discussion 
of Plantinga's response to Mackie on the logical problem of evil. This 
discussion reflects negatively on other things Geivett says about human 
freedom because it brings into question his understanding of the issues 
involved. The main problem is that he thinks the point underlying 
Plantinga's response to Mackie is the following: 
(1) It is logically possible in all possible worlds with significantly 
free creatures that at least one free creature will freely go wrong 
with respect to some moral choice, such that any such world 
will contain a modicum of moral evil (p. 198). 
(1) says that all possible worlds with significantly free creatures include 
at least one creature which could freely choose evil. That Plantinga 
accepts this is true but not that interesting. It just follows from his defini-
tion of significant freedom.5 It certainly is not the point underlying his 
free will defence. Furthermore, (1) also says that all worlds containing at 
least one creature which could freely choose evil thereby contain a mod-
icum of evil (whether or not the creature actually does any evil). But this 
is extremely odd; neither Plantinga nor anyone else I know of thinks a 
world contains evil simply in virtue of its containing free creatures. 
But perhaps Geivett didn't mean to attribute (1) as stated to 
Plantinga. Since Geivett intended (1) to express the point underlying 
Plantinga's free will defence, I think what he meant to say is that 
Plantinga is committed to the following: 
(1') It is logically possible that in all possible worlds with signifi-
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cantly free creatures at least one free creature will freely go 
wrong with respect to some moral choice, such that any such 
world will contain a modicum of moral evil. 
(Note that the only difference between (1) and (1') is that the first 'that' is 
shifted.) But Plantinga explicitly denies (1') when he concedes Mackie's 
point that there are worlds with free creatures none of whom goes 
wrong with respect to any action. The point underlying Plantinga's 
response to Mackie is, rather, that: 
(2) It is logically possible that in all possible worlds which God 
could weakly actualize with significantly free creatures at least one 
free creature will freely go wrong with respect to some moral 
choice.6 
The distinction between (1') and (2) is perhaps the crucial distinction in 
Plantinga's response to the logical problem of evil. And it is because 
Geivett (apparently) misses this distinction that he opts for the unusual 
conclusion that God chose not to weakly actualize a world with free crea-
tures none of whom ever does wrong even though he could have done so 
(see my discussion under point 1. above). There are several other prob-
lems in the neighborhood of this discussion which betray further misun-
derstanding (see especially p. 197) but I won't discuss them here. 
4. Eschatology. Finally, I want simply to note with respect to the prob-
lem of hell what Mackie noted concerning the problem of evil generally. 
Surely it is logically possible that all free creatures freely respond to God 
in love at some point before death or in the afterlife and thereby avoid 
an endless hell. Why couldn't God weakly actualize that state of affairs 
by creating only those free beings which his middle knowledge reveals 
would eventually freely respond to him in love? Plantinga's trans world 
depravity response could not be easily modified to deal with this ques-
tion. For according to traditional Christian theism, the actual world 
includes some free creatures who do in fact freely respond to God in 
love and thereby avoid hell whereas it does not include any free crea-
tures who in fact never do wrong. So the analogue of the possibility of 
universal transworld depravity (universal transworld obduracy?) is not 
available as a Christian response. This follow-up on Mackie's point sug-
gests that Geivett is wrong to say that God could not guarantee that no 
one remains forever in hell without forfeiting creaturely freedom; for 
God could (it seems) weakly actualize a world in which all free creatures 
eventually freely respond to him in love (before death or in the afterlife). 
I find it puzzling that Hick does not avail himself of this defence of the 
compatibility of universalism and human freedom. 
Obviously there is much in Geivett's book with which I disagree. 
Nevertheless, I believe his focus on natural theology and its connection 
with the problem of evil is worthy of our consideration. Geivett's cri-
tique of Hick's views is an original and valuable contribution to the liter-
ature on the soul-making tradition in theodicy. 
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NOTES 
1. See for example De Utilitate Credendi in Augustine: Earlier Writings, ed. 
and trans. by J.HS. Burleigh (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953), espe-
cially pp. 311-316 (paragraphs 24-29) where Augustine argues for the appro-
priateness of belief in God that is not based on reason. * 
2. God weakly actualizes a state of affairs S if and* only if (i) God causes S 
and all contingent states of affairs included in S to be actual and (ii) S* 
counterfactually implies S. 
3. Geivett sometimes wrongly assumes that Hick's point is the same as 
Mackie's (pp. 141-45). For Hick's own statement see his An Interpretation of 
Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1989), p. 80 and Arguments for the Existence of God (New York: Herder 
and Herder, 1971), pp. 34-35 (see also the afterword in Geivett's book, p. 
232). 
4. See David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Norman 
Kemp Smith (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1947), p. 169. 
5. The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 166. 
6. The Nature of Necessity, pp. 184-190. 
Gambling on God: Essays on Pascal's Wager, edited by Jeff Jordan. 
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1994. Pp. viii and 
168. $49.00 (Cloth), $19.95 (Paper). 
JOSHUA L. GOLDING, Bellarmine College 
This book is a collection of very good essays on Pascal's Wager. As 
far as I know, it is the first collection of its kind, and it is long overdue. 
Advanced undergraduates will find most of the essays readable and 
enlightening; graduate students and scholars will also find it very use-
ful, at least as a starting point in their study of secondary literature on 
the Wager. 
The back cover advertises that the book includes "new and classic 
essays." In the editor's introduction there is no indication of which are 
new or classic. The reader is left to assume from the notes (or lack there-
of) to each essay that the first two have already appeared; the third is 
based on material in an earlier book and the remaining six are apparent-
ly new. At least one of the "classic" essays (Ryan) is abridged; yet the 
innocent reader would not necessarily know this. But this is not at all to 
imply that the abridgement was unsuitable for this volume. Also, some 
of the "new" essays are not terribly new, but based to a large extent on 
older material. This is especially the case with the articles by Schlesinger 
and Jordan. Again, this is not a major complaint, since the goal of the 
book is to bring together in one volume some of the finer and more 
accessible work on the Wager. In any case, it appears that three of the 
essays-by Quinn, McClennen and Sorenson-are entirely new and rep-
resent genuine contributions to the literature on the Wager. 
